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Abstract 
 
We evaluate the factors that affect longevity in Africa, with the aim of offering an insight on how government economic policy 
and consumption spending affect the lives of people in developing countries. Government economic policy was found to be 
contributing in a negative manner to life expectancy in the countries in our sample. We also find that apathy between the civil 
service (the embodiment of institutions) and political office holders to be the greatest stumbling block against the success of 
governmental economic policy, this creates a hole in institutions since they remain the pipe through which revenue is disbursed 
and policies are implemented for the general good of the populace. After interacting institution with economic policy we find that 
economic policy has significant effect on life expectancy it was likely that institutions were either circumvented or ignored, 
leading to possible short comings on the overall effect that government economic policy would have had on life expectancy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Africa is plagued by a lot of diseases, social strife and civil wars, that are otherwise preventable. Malaria fever according 
World Health Organization report 2010 was responsible for about 655000 deaths in Africa in 2010 alone. Africa’s has a 
high population living below the poverty line, this makes it one of the poorest continents in the world past literature state 
that the average per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa is less than one-twentieth that of North America (Acemoglu D et 
al (2002) and Acemoglu (2004)). This paper1 addresses the impact of economic policy on longevity. According to United 
Nations statistics 2010,the average life expectancy in sub Saharan Africa is between 31.88 years for very poor countries 
like Swaziland to about 60.1 for middle income African countries like Ghana, with only very few people having access to 
public benefits (government fund). Some basic reasons for this are the lack of viable markets for domestic trade, its high 
amount of poorly educated people, and finally the presence of old and outdated machineries which are nonexistent in 
some instances for its manufacturing industry (Acemoglu D. et al (2002)). However these are just some theoretical and 
secondary reasons for under development in Africa2. The primary reason for underdevelopment in Africa continues to lie 
on the foundation upon which the present method of governance is built. Most of the institutions of governance were 
developed during the colonial era and where meant to serve the purpose of the colonial governments therefore they were 
not well suited to meet indigenous societal circumstances, since most of the colonies were used as raw material 
exporting economies particularly in tropical regions. This meant that institutions were apparently weak and unreliable. 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of government economic policy on life expectancy in Africa. We 
identify problems that could affect life expectancy on the short run, as short term pay out used to dose civil agitations 
such as political unrest and civil strikes as likely factors that is unobservable overtime, since these kind of agitations many 
a times forces governments to make humane decisions, and are likely to be correlated with life expectancy on the short 
run, we expect this to be reflected in government consumption spending. This makes us divide government economic 
                                                            
1 I am grateful to Bergamo University Department of Economics for providing funds for this research. 
2  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) examine the differences in European death rates in order to estimate the effect of 
institutions, on economic performance. Europeans were noticed to have adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies 
with rest to its geographical position, with different associated institutions.  
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decisions into two spheres which are its monetary and trade policies which we call its economic policy on one hand, and 
it policies regarding social spending which we call government consumption spending on the other. The reason for this is 
that it is likely that government spending will contribute positively to longevity, but we do not expect their monetary and 
trade policy to contribute to longevity in a positive manner particularly in developing countries with weak institutions, since 
institutions can weaken government policies if they are ineffective or bypassed. Secondly we also wish to determine the 
extent to which government consumption spending (its fiscal policy component) cushions factors that are a risk to 
longevity in Africa. We use panel data and two stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable approach to address the 
problem of endogeneity since government economic policy and its fiscal spending are likely to suffer from measurement 
problems. The rest of this paper is divided into five sections, constraints to longevity in Africa, some theory, data 
description, and empirical analysis and finally the concluding sections. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Africa’s huge deposits of untapped natural resource also contributes to its burden, it makes it highly susceptible to 
corruption. Past studies also show that countries endowed with high levels of natural resources do tend to grow more 
slowly compared to those with little or no resource (see Sachs and Warner, 1995), and growth could also be weakened if 
institutional frameworks are weak (see Mehlum et al, 2006)3. The presence of natural resource in developing countries 
therefore plays a role in weakening institutions in developing countries, since it provides government with alternative 
revenue to run government, preventing it from setting up effective taxation mechanism for sustainable revenue generation 
(see Ross 2001). Institutional weakness is also prevalent today among African countries because of the gross neglect of 
the civil service and due process in policy implementation, government can for example rely on its revenues from natural 
resource to repress dissent, either through paying off opposition (by awarding them contracts in high profile infrastructure 
projects) resulting to weakening of the civil service or governing through violence and intimidation. Corruption can also 
lead to failure of democratic governments in developing countries since this can have adverse effect on growth and 
internal stability (Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001)4. The weaknesses in the internal structures of developing countries often give 
room to corrupt officials to run government policies in a vague manner or to lead the populace in these developing 
countries in complete secrecy. Through the implementation of weak economic policies an oligarch class often emerges 
that rules with impunity and become gradually insensitive to the plight of the populace. The effective use of institutions for 
governance in conjunction with a reliable civil service structure can help rectify this problem. Institutions can be classified 
into different categories such as judicial institutions, democratic institutions, and economic institutions. 
 Life expectancy can have serious effects on productivity in developing countries. Past literature has discussed the 
relation between longevity and growth in a host of industrialized countries. Barro (1989) discovered that as the life 
expectancy of a country rises to the age of 69, the level of investment and the growth rate increased in a reasonable 
manner for many developed countries; but in cases where life expectancy rises to the age of 70 and beyond, the level of 
investment and the growth rate drops, this was higher for developed countries compared to developing countries.5 (See 
Lee, Zhang and Zhang (2002) for more explanations). Other papers have investigated the impact that population aging 
has on growth Auerbach and Kotlikoơ (1992), found that population aging has a possible adverse impact on national 
savings, while Preston (1987) found that aging increases the competition for resources between the consumption and 
health needs of old people and the investment in children. Attaining old age also means that inheritance could likely be 
received by the children of such elderly people, who will likely pass on their wealth to their offspring, and the amount of 
such inheritance may be reduced however by longer years of consumption by the elderly due to sickness or possible 
periods of inactivity see Kalemi-Ozcan (2002) and Soares (2005). Kelley and Schmidt (1995)6 found a positive effect, in 
                                                            
3  Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) also explain how institutions are weakened by the presences of natural resources through 
corruption and the scramble for allocation of exploration rights thereby limiting growth in resource rich countries.  
4Michael Ross (2001) in “Extractive Sectors and the Poor” explains the link between corruption and mineral extraction and how 
democracies are likely to fail due to foreign interest and institutional weakness in resource rich developing countries. He finds that the 
scramble for power is often associated with the presence of natural resources in many developing countries. 
5Barro(1989) using a cross-section of countries, found that investment ratio and growth increased for developed countries with life 
expectancy of up to 69 years, but as life expectancy increased beyond 70 years growth rate decreased and investment reduced 
considerably. 
6Kelly and Schmidt (1995)  in “Aggregate Population and Economic Growth Correlation: The Role of The Component of Demographic 
Change” found that longevity has a positive significant effect on growth. The implication of their study is that cushioning factors that 
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the reduction in death rates, on growth in less developed countries suggesting that longevity drives growth in a number of 
countries. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) also find a slight positive effect of life expectancy on growth but state that life 
expectancy does not affect income. 
 
3. Constraints to Longevity in Africa 
 
Several factors work together to increase mortality rate in developing countries and sub Saharan Africa in particular. 
Some of these include infectious tropical diseases that often affect their marginalized population due to poor education, 
lack of social awareness, political instability and civil strife. Infectious tropical diseases are often a major cause of high 
death rate prevalent in many sub Saharan African countries since most of the people in sub Saharan Africa live below the 
poverty line, therefore the tendency for disease to spread and patients to die as a result of inability to afford medical 
treatment is high. Cholera for instance, according to the World Health Organization report 2010 caused about 130000 
deaths with over 2.5 million infected worldwide. In Africa alone according to United Nations Children Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) report 2011 more than 85000 cases of cholera infection has been recorded with a 4.7 percent mortality rate. 
Other diseases such as Human Immuno Virus (HIV), responsible for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome disease 
(AIDS) for instance is a major cause of death in sub Saharan Africa. Sub Saharan Africa according to 2009 United 
Nations Statistics also accounts for about 65% of HIV AIDS infected people and about 75% of all deaths associated with 
HIV AIDS Worldwide. While malaria fever, polio, tuberculosis etc are widely responsible for a high amount of death 
among Africa’s population. Government economic policies if favorable can empower people through employment, to 
afford access to health care and decent living which can prevent premature death.  
 Social factors such as poor education and lack of information regarding treatment and preventive methods that 
could be useful in avoiding the risk of infection are also lacking, poor literacy rate makes it cumbersome to pass on such 
information to the populace. UNESCO World education regional review of year 2000 showed that only about 52% of the 
children in sub-Saharan Africa were enrolled in primary schools, this was the lowest anywhere in the World. Africa also 
recorded the highest number of children deprived of basic education according to Transparency International World 
report of 2010 conducted among 8500 educators in seven countries. Africa continues to account for the highest amount 
of illiterate adults worldwide and has one of the lowest school enrollment rates. Preventing major illness and other factors 
that can lead to early deaths can many a time hinge on early detection and prevention which can be achieved better in a 
more literate and socially aware society. Good information can help eradicate poor religious practices, outdated 
customary traditional rites and beliefs that are a risk to longevity such as female genital mutilation which can in some 
instance lead to death through female circumcision infections. Poverty and unemployment is also rampant among the 
population, this often makes a large section of the population to be vulnerable since in some instances they are likely not 
to be able to afford access to basic social amenities.  
 Political factors such as instability and civil strife can in some cases lead to civil war and a high degree of 
uncertainty. This can make government to fail leading to a disruption in daily life. This in turn can affect economic 
activities and cause a lot of suffering due to shortages of basic supplies, which if exist for a prolonged period of time can 
lead to poor living standard and outbreak of epidemics. Some examples of political factors that can increase mortality 
rates are civil wars, civil disturbances, ethnic cleansing and ethnic clashes. The second Congo civil war of 1998 to 2003 
according to United Nations 2004 Statistics is recorded among the deadliest African civil wars in modern history, with the 
war alone responsible for as many as 5.4 million people killed from the war, with most deaths as a result of the underlying 
effects of the war particularly starvation. Institutional weakness within the body polity of a country can also be responsible 
for most political factors related deaths since good institutions can prevent a systematic breakdown of the governing 
authority thereby preventing a gradual drift into anarchy. 
 
4. Theory and Methodology 
 
We present a simple theory to depict how governmental policy will interplay with other interaction within and outside a 
system in shaping the life expectancy or longevity of people living within a specified geographical location. Our theoretical 
model is such that a change in life expectancy depends on the change in government economic policy and its interaction 
                                                                                                                                                                  
increase mortality will benefit government by allowing people to contribute more to the society if they live longer thereby creating wealth 
for the society. 
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with other country specific factors and exogenous variables that affect life expectancy. The change in life expectancy with 
respect to changes in government specific economic policy will depend upon other interactions, such as other factor 
within the system such as wages (w) which represents the relative individual income that allows the citizenry to access 
the basic provisions within a system with an intent of living a comfortable life, the cost of capital (v) which depicts the cost 
of maintaining and providing social amenities, the quality of institutions (I) through which these policies are implemented 
and other exogenous variables (z). The model suggests that it is the factors that affect life expectancy in general that 
determine how long an individual within any given system will live. So government will tend to maximize their policy 
subject to the constraints that limit or improve how effective economic policies can produce the desired effects in 
improving longevity.  
 If we consider the countries to be firms whose cost are functions of several factors. These include the cost of labor 
(w), the cost of capital (v) in executing socio economic projects, day to day costs of running institutions (I), and some 
other form of social or economic interest (z). The cost of labor is the wage rate per unit of output produced. The cost of 
capital can be viewed as the typical rental price of capital but also more broadly as to include additional factors impacting 
the cost of obtaining capital such as access to credit. Running costs are a function of provision of basic amenities such as 
health care and more importantly other forms infrastructure, while the cost of maintaining an international status and 
ideology of some form can be viewed a form of social or national interest that can attract investment or international 
confidence by portraying the presence of stability in a country to shore up investor confidence. So, the firms total cost 
function can be written asܶܥ௜ ൌ ௜݂ሺݓǡ ݒǡ ܫǡ ݖሻ ௜ܺ. The marginal cost (MC) can be expressed as ௜݂ሺݓǡ ݒǡ ܫǡ ݖሻǤ as firms’ 
investment in human capital increase we expect an increase in output leading to some level of prosperity thereby 
improving longevity. We can assume that eventually scarcities will occur and the marginal cost of production will rise. This 
can occur because of the rising cost of investing in an additional citizen and/or because of increase in capital costs of 
maintaining a citizen is rising. Eventually, there reaches a point at which equilibrium occurs in the sector. This profit 
maximization point ( ௜ܺכ) will represent the point at whichܯܴ௜ ൌ ܯܥ௜, also expressed as ௜ܲ ൌ ௜݂ሺݓǡ ݒǡ ܫǡ ݖሻwhere the 
cost in maintaining a citizen or catering for an additional citizen will equal the output that such a citizen will produce on the 
long run . One of the goals of government economic policy ሺ݌௜ሻ is to improve living conditions of the citizens in their 
countries. There are many ways in which this can occur. Government economic policy can increase education and 
training of workers, which would lower the firms labor cost per unit produced. So, the wage cost per unit produced can be 
expressed as a negative function of economic policy ݓ௜ሺ݌௜ሻǤ Economic policy may also subsidize social amenities for 
citizens or come in the form of provisions of schools or product subsidy like petrol or gas used for individuals and 
households. Therefore, we can write the cost of capital as a negative function of government economic policy, 
ݒ௜ሺ݌௜ሻǤThe availability of wealth to a country may also lead to the promotion of a social status for a country with it might 
come some form of rent seeking behavior of government officials since more funds flowing into ideological projects may 
end up been diverted by corrupt officials seeking higher payout and have a spillover effect on the quality of institutions. 
Therefore, the costs imposed by rent seeking officials are modeled as a positive function of government economic policy, 
ݖ௜ሺ݌௜ሻǤ with policy included in the model we can rewrite the equilibrium condition as 
ߪ௜ ൌ ௜݂ሾݓ௜ሺ݌௜ሻǡ ݒ௜ሺ݌௜ሻǡ ܫ௜ሺ݌௜ሻܼ௜ሺ݌௜ሻሿ .  
 We can now examine the impact of the equilibrium condition from a change in economic policy. We will assume 
that economic policy does not impact output; therefore, the differentiation of this condition with respect to economic policy 
is only a differentiation of the marginal cost function. This can be expressed as shown below. 
(1.) డ௟೔డ௣೔ ൌ
డ௟೔
డ௪೔
డ௪೔
డ௣೔ ൅
డ௟೔
డ௩೔
డ௩೔
డ௣೔ ൅
డ௟೔
డூ೔
డூ೔
డ௣೔ ൅
డ௟೔
డ௭೔
డ୸
డ௣೔ 
first expression on the right hand side ( డ௟೔డ௪೔
డ௪೔
డ௣೔ ൑ Ͳ) represents government economic policy potentially lowering 
the cost of labor. The scenario where government economic policy potentially lowers cost of capital is represented as 
డ௟೔
డ௩೔
డ௩೔
డ௣೔ ൑ Ͳ. The potential reduction in costs of running institutions is shown as 
డ௟೔
డூ೔
డூ೔
డ௣೔ ൑ Ͳ. The possible rise in rent 
seeking or other socio economic interest costs of some sorts is the last term on the right hand side which is డ௟೔డ௭೔
డ௭೔
డ௣೔ ൒ Ͳ. 
Therefore, the overall impact of government economic policy is combining three potential cost reduction factors (w, v, I,) 
with one potential cost increase (z). Whether or not the overall sign of డ௟೔డ௣೔ is greater or less than zero will depend to a 
large extent on the quality of a country’s institutions and on how the government economic policy is directed. If 
government economic policy is directed towards more productive uses that lower ' labor, capital and/or institutional costs 
of providing basic social amenities then this will help turn the prediction towards lower marginal costs. If marginal costs of 
providing basic social amenities fall for countries as a result of effective government economic policy devoid of corruption, 
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then life expectancy will increase. In other words, if డ௟೔డ௣೔ ൏ Ͳ  and 
డ௫೔
డ௣೔ ൐ Ͳ  . We estimate two variants of our life 
expectancy equation in equation 2 and 3 below, where we capture the cost of capital using country specific income, the 
percent of people who earn wages with the total labor market participation rate and institution using an index for the 
quality of institutions. Our model present a case where life expectancy ሺܮ݂݅݁Ǥ ݁ݔ݌௜௧ሻ is a function of, government 
economic policy ሺ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ǡ௧ሻǡand our vector of exogenous effects that affect life expectancy ௜ܺ௧. Our list of exogenous 
variables in equation 2, consist of, income (GDP per capita) the quality of institutions which captures the effectiveness of 
institutions in executing government policies and bringing its  
ሺʹǤ ሻܮ݂݅݁Ǥ ݁ݔ݌௜௧=ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺǡ௧+ ߚଶ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
ሺ͵Ǥ ሻܮ݂݅݁Ǥ ݁ݔ݌௜௧=ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺǡ௧+ ߚଶܩ݋ݒǤ ܵ݌݁݊݀݅݊݃௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
impact close to the grassroots, labor market participation rate which reflects the percentage of the population that 
can access basic facilities (since they are not free) through been empowered by some form of employment, foreign aid 
since most African countries receive foreign aid, access to basic health care which reflects how easy it is for the 
population living within a country to access basic health services to reduce risk of death related to infections and 
diseases, access to basic clean drinking water which captures the availability of social amenities, country specific total 
population which puts a strain on the budget of a country depending on how populated a country is although we use the 
logarithm of population in our final analysis due to scaling issues in our estimates. We separate our fiscal variables from 
what we call government economic policy so as to allow us differentiate the difference of the impact of government 
monetary and trade policy from its fiscal policy. The reason for this is that government consumption spending is likely to 
have a strong effect on life expectancy therefore investigating its effect on life expectancy will allows us know the extent 
to which government welfare spending in African countries affect life expectancy. We rewrite equation 2 to depict the 
effect of government consumption spending ܩ݋ݒǤ ܵ݌݁݊݀݅݊݃௜ǡ௧ on life expectancy in equation 3 as shown above. We 
present below the hypothesis that we wish to test in this study. Finally we interact economic policy with institutions to 
determine the effect of institutions on economic policy effectiveness. We rewrite equation 2 below as equation 2\! 
(2! Ǥ ሻܮ݂݅݁Ǥ ݁ݔ݌=ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺǡ௧+ ߚଶ݌݋݈ଓܿݕ෣ ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷ݅݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
Where interact = economic policy*institutional quality 
We present below the hypothesis that we wish to test in this paper as follows, 
- Hypothesis #1.) Government Economic policy (it’s monetary and trade policy) can have either a positive 
effect or negative effect on life expectancy due to poor institutions. 
- Hypothesis #2.) Government Consumption spending (government fiscal policy) will have a positive effect on 
life expectancy due to high prevalence of diseases and shortages of social amenities in Africa.  
- Hypothesis #3.) Economic policy will have a positive effect on life expectancy if institutions are taken into 
consideration in executing such policies. 
 
5. Data and Sources 
 
We present a summary of all variables used below. We obtain data for five countries in Africa, four in sub Saharan Africa 
and one in North Africa (i.e. Kenya, Botswana, Ghana Cameroon and Egypt) for a period of 1980 to 2008 although some 
are missing. 
 
5.1 Description of Dependent Variable  
 
Our dependent variable life expectancy is obtained from World development indicator data of the World Bank; life 
expectancy is defined as the average life span for men and women living within any specified geographical location. It 
depicts the average mortality rate for men and women by country. In most cases it is calculated separately for men and 
women due to the difference in probability of dying. Many factors affect life expectancy such as infant mortality rates and 
geographical location since some diseases are likely to thrive in some areas of the world than others. Life expectancy is 
therefore calculated as the average probability of surviving based on age, sex, geographical location etc therefore it is 
defined as an arithmetic mean calculated by integrating the survival curve from age 0 to positive infinity.  
 
5.2 Description of Government Economic Policy and Institutional quality indices  
 
We construct government economic policy index using principal component analysis (PCA). We use data that depict 
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government monetary (inflation) trade (trade openness) and fiscal(government spending )policies to capture the variation 
in economic policy, based on past literature e.g. Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Elbers et al (2001) that have previously 
used regression component approach to generate indices. Having a single index for economic policy 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Observation Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Life expectancy 195 55.04 5.11 44.63 68.41 
logarithm of GDP per Capita 195 13.36 0.84 11.87 15.79 
Foreign Aid/GDP 104 4.39 2.98 0.77 16 
Health Access 141 73.33 22.62 5 99 
Population 195 2.1 1.92 0.06 7.73 
Labor Market Participation Rate 145 68.8 10.95 47.8 82.4 
Water Access 195 48.1 28.93 2 97 
School Enrollment Rate (0-15years) 183 88.94 15.64 55.15 119.87 
Torture Rate 140 0.59 0.61 0 2 
Electoral Self Determination Rate 140 0.99 0.73 0 2 
Ethnic Fractionalization Rate 195 83 78.13 8 230 
Political Imprisonment 140 0.87 0.83 0 2 
Government Economic Policy Index 143 50.36 1.19 48.52 53.68 
Institutional Quality Index 140 78.81 1.9 74.65 81.17 
Government Consumption Spending 143 3.85 42.63 0.01 510 
Market Capitalization Rate 78 1.01 2.32 0.01 14 
Foreign Direct Investment 171 1.67 2.6 -10.782 15.59 
Inflation 190 15.05 17.4 -3.21 122.63 
Openness 195 70.24 30.56 22.25 157.625 
Crude Oil Prices 195 42.72 21.48 15.93 99.11 
 
allows us to discuss the effect of economic policy as a whole on life expectancy instead of enumerating the individual 
effect of the different economic policy variables. Inflation is the increase in the price of goods and services in a country 
over a period of time; we obtain this from World Bank data. While openness is given as exports plus import divided by 
gross domestic product (GDP) this captures country specific trade policy we obtain this data from Penn World Tables 
both for a period of 1980 to 2008. We dropped our fiscal variable government consumption spending to explore the effect 
of government monetary and trade decisions on life expectancy independent of our fiscal variable, government 
consumption spending has the tendency to alleviate poverty and cushion the effect of factors that can affect longevity, 
this allows us to evaluate the difference in the effect of government consumption spending on life expectancy differently.  
 
5.3 Other explanatory variables 
 
Other data used include population which represents the number of people living per geographical square kilometer per 
country, but we take the logarithm of population to resolve issues of scaling so as to have our estimates in three decimal 
places, access to healthcare, labor market participation rate, school enrollment rate and foreign aid. Labor market 
participation represents the percentage of the working population that participates in a country job market, while school 
enrollment is the percentage of children from 0-15 years that are enrolled in schools this reflects the level of social 
awareness and enlightenment present in a country. Our data for foreign aid captures total flow of official aid to countries 
(bilateral plus multilateral aid) we include aid because aid consists of a reasonable percentage of the GDP of most 
developing countries. We use market capitalization to capture the effect of organized domestic trade on life expectancy 
since the capital market often acts as a way of saving or investing money for the future, while foreign direct investment 
captures the effect of inflow of foreign investment and international trade on life expectancy. We capture country specific 
cost of living using transportation cost represented as the cost of crude oil price to reflect the impact that country specific 
cost of living has on life expectancy. We obtained also the percentage immunization for children between the ages of 0 to 
15 years of age to capture country specific access to medical (or health) care, while the percentage of the population that 
had access to good drinking water was used to capture the level of provision of basic social amenities. Finally we obtain 
data on government spending form data market of Iceland., all data are obtained from the World bank data for a period of 
1980 to 2008, except otherwise stated.  
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6. Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
 We estimate three variants of life expectancy equations as shown in the equations 4 to 9 below. Our assertion is that 
government decisions is of two forms one that deals with its monetary and trade decisions (which we call economic 
policy) and the other that captures its public spending (which we call government spending). It is reasonable that they 
should have an impact on life expectancy in a different manner with government consumption spending have much more 
capability in reducing mortality rate due to its direct focus on welfare projects and depending on the level of 
implementation of government policies which could either have a positive result or otherwise. If the aim of government is 
to make life relatively comfortable for its citizens, we expect that government economic and social decisions will be one 
that mitigates risk associated with mortality rate and alleviates poverty through employment. Hausman specification test 
was run to choose between fixed and random effects. Results accept the null hypothesis that the fixed effects estimator is 
not biased (p-values are all considerably lower than .01) for the two variants of our life expectancy equation. The use of 
instrumental variables approach is because of the endogeneity of the economic policy and government consumption 
spending variables since they are likely to suffer from measurement problems. A Hausman-Wu test rejected the null 
hypothesis that economic policy and government spending were exogenous, with a p-value of 0.00. Therefore, using 
them as independent variables could lead to biased results. We use instruments as proxy for both government policy and 
consumption spending and assume that they are endogenous. We present three variants of our life expectancy equation 
below to explain how economic policy and consumption spending affects life expectancy. 
 
6.1 Life Expectancy Model Specification with Economic Policy 
 
In the first variant of the life expectancy, in equation 5 life expectancy depends on economic policy and our vector of 
exogenous ୧ǡ୲which consist of foreign aid, access to health  
ሺͶǤ ሻܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜௧ =ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܺ௧+ ߙଶܼ௜௧ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ Ɋ௜௧ 
ሺͷǤ ሻܮ݂݅݁Ǥ ݁ݔ݌௜௧=ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺǡ௧+ ߚଶܲ݋݈ଓܿݕ෣ ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܿ௜ +Ɋ௜௧  
care, the logarithm of income (GDP per capita), the quality of institutions, access to water (which capture provision 
of basic social amenities), country specific population, labor market participation rate, cost of living and school enrollment 
rate. Life expectancy therefore is expected to be affected by the rate at which government responds to economic factors 
that are likely to increase mortality rate. Hyper inflation for example could mean firms closing down and laying off workers 
and adverse reduction in trade could result in a general shrinkage of a nation’s economy leading to adverse economic 
circumstances such as reduced national income and lack of funds to maintain infrastructure and social services. Since we 
suggest that government economic policy is likely to suffer from measurement problems, so we assume that it is 
endogenous. Equation 4 represents the reduced form of the equation for government economic policy, government 
economic policy depends on country specific income, and our vector of instrumentܼ௜௧. Therefore we estimate equation 4 
and 5 simultaneously. We achieve exclusion by assuming that certain variables (in this case a variable) are correlated 
with government economic policy in equation 4 but not with life expectancy in equation 5, allowing us to achieve 
identification by excluding some variables in equation 5. We use country investment in stocks as instrument for economic 
policy, this allows us to conduct instrument correction for economic policy in equation 4. 
  
6.2 Life Expectancy Model Specification with Government Consumption Spending 
 
The second variant of the life expectancy specification is shown below, government consumption spending is assumed to 
be endogenous in equation 7, so we conduct the  
ሺ͸Ǥ ሻܩ݋ݒǤ ܵ݌݁݊݀݅݊݃௜௧ =ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܺ௧+ ߙଶܼ௜௧ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅Ɋ௜௧ 
ሺ͹Ǥ ሻܮ݂݅݁Ǥ ݁ݔ݌௜௧=ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺǡ௧+ ߚଶܩ݋ݒǤ ܵ݌݁݊݀ଓ݊݃෣ ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܿ௜ +Ɋ௜௧  
instrumental correction in equation 6. Life expectancy depends on government consumption spending and our 
vector of exogenous variables. Our vectors of exogenous variablesሺ ௜ܺǡ௧) are the logarithm of population, income (GDP 
per capita) labor market participation, market capitalization rate, foreign direct investment inflow, school enrollment rate, 
electoral self determination (political stability) exchange rate, inflation and openness. The disposition for increased 
government consumption spending will depend on a host of factors, its income, and the condition of its economy as well 
as its political disposition. Therefore if a government sees it citizens as some form of assets that will bring some 
meaningful economic gains to it on the long-run it will embark on social spending with the aim of getting returns. So we 
expect government spending to have a positive effect on life expectancy. We assume that government consumption 
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spending is endogenous since it suffers from measurement problems since short term payouts such as salary increases 
and social benefits e.g. subsidies make up government consumption spending and affect life expectancy on the short run. 
In equation 6, government consumption spending depends on the logarithm of country specific income, and our vectors 
of instrumentsܼ௜௧. In this case we use health access as instrument for government consumption spending, this allows us 
to conduct instrumental correction in equation 6, since we assume that government spending is endogenous. 
 
6.3 Economic policy and interaction variable institution (policy*institutions 
 
The third variant of the life expectancy equation is presented in equations 8 and 9. Including an interactive variable 
(interact) policy*institutions offers additional opportunity to study the effect institution has on policy effectiveness. Using 
predictive variables that capture economic policy in our first stage we regressed economic policy on income and stocks of 
investment and obtain the residuals since economic policy is endogenous, we multiplied the residuals with institutions to 
get our interaction variable (interact) and use the interaction variable in our second stage this method is known as 
General Least Square (GLS). Our interaction variable will depend on institutional quality’s effect on economic policy this 
allows us to depict how institutions affect economic policy effectiveness using GLS random effects.  
ሺͺǤ ሻ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜௧ =ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܺ௧+ ߙଶܼ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
ሺͻǤ ሻܮ݂݅݁Ǥ ݁ݔ݌௜௧=ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺǡ௧+ ߚଶ݌݋݈ଓܿݕ෣ ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷ݅݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 
6.4 Instruments 
 
We explain carefully why our exclusion restriction will hold for our different model specifications. The exclusion restriction 
we impose on our life expectancy equation is that the instrument should be correlated with economic policy in the first set 
of equations (equations 4 and 5), government consumption spending in the second set of equations (equation 6 and 7), 
and economic policy again in the third set of equations where we used two stage GLS (equation 8 and 9) but not with life 
expectancy. Theoretically this will hold based on the following conditions, if the coefficient for our endogenous variable in 
our structural equation after imposing the restriction (where we use our instrument as a proxy for the endogenous 
variable) tends to that in our reduced form equation secondly, if the correlation between the instrument Z and the error 
term ߝ௜ǡ௧ is identically equal to zero as shown below in equation 10.  
 (10) E|ܼ௜ǡ௧Ǥ ߝ௜ǡ௧ | = 0.  
This shows that our instrument ܼ௜ǡ௧ is uncorrelated with the disturbancesߝ௜ǡ௧. This stipulates that the only way our 
instrument is related with life expectancy is only through the endogenous variable and finally, if the exogenous 
component of the instrument, (the fitted value of the endogenous variable for economic policy and government spending 
as the case maybe) is uncorrelated with the error term, we can identify the variation in the dependent variable life 
expectancy (in years) as the slope of coefficientߚଶ (see Kraay (2008) for further discussion on exclusion restriction) we 
depict this in equation 11 below.  
 (11) Cov (݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ǡ௧Ǥ ߝ௜ǡ௧) 0 and Cov (݃݋ݒǤ ݏ݌݁݊݀݅݊݃௜ǡ௧Ǥ ߝ௜ǡ௧) 0  
This means that ߙଶ in not zero therefore life expectancy will vary with changes in economic policy and government 
spending. Our Instrument should fulfill the above conditions for our exclusion restriction to hold, we explain this further 
below in a nut shell econometrically as follows. First, our instruments should have a significant impact on the variable 
they predict. Secondly the instrument should not have an impact on the dependent variable (life expectancy in this case) 
in the second equation. While often this is tested empirically, Wooldridge (2010) and others have pointed out that this 
also needs to be done on the theoretical level as testing the impact of the instrument on the dependent variable in the 
second equation (life expectancy) with a full model could be biased as the instrumental correction has not been made for 
in the endogenous variable (i.e. economic policy or government consumption spending as the case maybe). We use 
country specific stock of investment as instrument for economic policy, while we use health access for government 
consumption spending. Investment in stocks reflects the value that investors place on country stock and the value of 
stocks at any point in time also reflects the quality of government economic policy. We expect stock of investment to be 
correlated with government economic policy but not with life expectancy for our exclusion restriction to hold for our first 
set of equations (i.e. equations 4 and 5). One way to view this is that investors will hold a country’s stocks as long as the 
government maintains stable, sound and consistent economic policies and in cases where a government economic policy 
is weak, investors are likely to dump such stocks or not invest in such economies. We also expect that a country specific 
stock of investment will have no direct effect on life expectancy since if government does not have good economic and 
social policy to reduce factors that are a risk to longevity, gains from investment might not affect life expectancy. 
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Therefore the only way through which stock of investment will be related to life expectancy is through government 
economic policy. This allows us to solve the first and second stage equation simultaneously to overcome the problem of 
endogeneity, which we associate with government economic policy in equations 4 and 5. In equations 6 and 7, which is 
our second specification where we consider the effect of government consumption spending on life expectancy, we use 
country specific access to health care as instrument for government consumption spending. We expect for our exclusion 
restriction to hold ( in the second set of equations i.e. 6 and 7), that health care access should be correlated with 
government spending in equation 6, but not directly with life expectancy in our second in equation 7.This will be based on 
the fact that access to medical care even though if available, is not likely to be free nor easily afforded in many African 
countries which are characterized with high a population of poor people, so we do not expect that the availability of 
medical care will lead automatically to increase in life expectancy. The only way through which health access will be 
related to life expectancy is through government spending, if government creates enabling environment (through its 
spending) in which people can develop skills at subsidized rate through investment in skill acquisition and training of 
human capital so that its citizens can become empowered economically (since this could likely lead to job creation), its 
citizens will therefore have the means to afford health care. Based on these two assumptions we are able to impose our 
exclusion restriction on our two different model specifications (i.e. the life expectancy models with economic policy and 
government spending) and argue that our restrictions will hold. We use only one instrument in each case so our model 
specifications are exactly identified since we have the same number of instrument as endogenous regressor in each case 
(i.e. for economic policy and government consumption spending). Therefore we do not test the third condition for 
instrument validity, which is the Sargan over-identification test which is necessary if there are more instruments than 
endogenous variables being estimated (which is not the case in our analysis). 
Good instruments for government economic policy are not easily available. Many economic factors cannot be 
directly controlled by policy makers however some that can be directly controlled are used in the construction of our 
economic policy variable, Tinbergen (1978) Asiedu (2006) identified specific factors that influence economic policy such 
as inflation and trade openness as factors within the control of government and policy makers. Country specific 
investment in stocks is a good instrument for government economic policy. Since government can for instance decide to 
set rules regarding the levels of public private ownership within their domain, thereby regulating the amount of the stock 
of private investment, therefore governments can indirectly determine the degree of economic liberalization present in the 
economy of a country (see Winters (2004) for further discussion of how governments regulate markets during 
liberalization reforms). Investment in stocks should be highly correlated with economic policy but not with life expectancy 
since it is reasonable that the flow of foreign and domestic investment into the private sector will be due investor’s 
perception that there will be continuity in governments sound and consistent economic policies overtime but not related 
directly with life expectancy. We also expect that government consumption spending should improve welfare and reduce 
mortality rate. This makes health access a good candidate for instrument for the second specification. Access to 
healthcare should therefore be correlated with government consumption spending but not life expectancy. One possible 
way to depict this as stated earlier is the fact that developing countries can experience an increase in the numbers of 
clinics for instance which could reflective of increased government consumption spending, without necessarily achieving 
an increase in employment rate so its poor citizens are not likely to afford medical care since it is not free, making 
availability of healthcare not to have a significant effect directly on life expectancy. Our instruments are highly correlated 
with our endogenous variables and relevant (see first stage regressions results in Tables 2 and 3 below). 
 
Table 2. First Stage: Economic Policy Regressions 
Method of Estimation OLS
GDP/capita -0.73
(.75)
Institutional quality -0.31
(.21)
Foreign Aid -0.008
(.05)
Access to Medical Care -0.008
(.05)
Provision of Social Amenities -0.01
(.01)
Population 1.59
(1.21)
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Exchange Rate 0.19
(.14)*
FDI 0.05
(.04)
Labor Market Labor Participation 0.14
(.23)
School Enrollment 0.07
(.05)
Cost of living 0.30
(.06)
Stock of Investment -0.003
(.001)***
F-Test 8.55
Chi2 (p-value) 0.03
# of observations 70
R-Squared 0.50
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** refers to
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. First stage results in Appendix.
 
Table 3. First Stage: Government Consumption Spending Regressions 
 
Method of Estimation OLS
GDP/capita -1.17
(.63)*
Population 0.33
(1.21)
Labor Market Participation Rate -0.68
(.35)
FDI -0.04
(.04)
Market Capitalization 0.01
(.01)
Population 1.59
(1.21)
School Enrollment 0.003
(.02)
Exchange rate 0.02
(.01)**
Inflation -0.001
(.01)
Openness -0.04
(.01)
Political Stability -0.12
(.14)
Health Access 0.04
(.01)***
F-Test 17.99
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00
# of observations 52
R-Squared 0.99
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** refers to
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. First stage results in Appendix.
  
6.5 Results 
 
We use fixed effect regression, for the first two specification of our life expectancy equations, since the result of the 
Hausman test with p-value 0.000 suggest that fixed effect estimation is more appropriate for our model, see Baltagi 
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(2005), Baltagi and Wu (2010) and Wooldridge (2010) for further discussion. We include year effect to capture the 
differences in life expectancy over years. Our results are shown in Tables 4 to 5. We control for time effect using time 
dummies for the specification for economic policy and government consumption spending but not for the model with the 
“interact” effect where we use year because it does not follow a chi square distribution with year dummies. The results of 
our F-test in Tables 2 and 3 shows that our instruments are highly correlated with the first stage dependent variables 
respectively. The results in Table 4 show that economic policy has no effect on life expectancy using OLS (with p-value 
0.914) and has a negative significant effect on life expectancy using 2SLS after controlling for endogeneity, using 
investment in stock as instrumental correction for economic policy (with p-value 0.016). This shows the importance of 
controlling for endogeneity since economic policy might suffer from measurement problems. The results in Table 5 show 
that government consumption spending has an effect (with p-value 0.014) on life expectancy using OLS and has a 
stronger effect (with p-value 0.000) on life expectancy using 2SLS. This shows the reliance of using health access as 
instrumental correction for government consumption spending, since we assume that government consumption is 
endogenous. The results in Table 6 show that government economic policy has a negative effect (p-value 0.019) on life 
expectancy without interacting economic policy with institution. After interacting economic policy with institutions the 
interactive variable (interact) becomes weakly statistically significant (p-value 0.061). This shows that economic policy 
contributes to a reduction in life expectancy, without the appropriate institutions to execute policies. It is likely that 
economic policy is not effective due to apathy between the civil service (the embodiment of institutions) and government 
officials who float economic policies making economic policy not to be contributing in a significant manner to improving 
life expectancy. Based on the above results we answer the hypothesis that we posed earlier below 
- Hypothesis #1.) Government Economic policy (governments monetary and trade policy) had a negative 
significant effect on life expectancy. It was likely that economic policy was contributing negatively to longevity 
in the countries in our sample. 
- Hypothesis #2.) Government Consumption spending (government fiscal policy) had a positive effect on life 
expectancy. This shows that government consumption spending was likely contributing to increase in longevity 
since it consisted of welfare spending used in cushioning risk factors to longevity through the establishment of 
health facilities, provision of social infrastructure such as schools, access to clean drinking water, creating 
social awareness etc. 
- Hypothesis #3.) Economic policy was found to contribute to longevity in a significant manner when 
institutional quality was interacted with economic policy. It was likely that institutions were not taken into 
consideration or bypassed in economic policy implementation. Implementing policies through appropriate 
channels such as a credible civil service and following due process could lead to a substantial improvement in 
economic policy effectiveness. 
 
Table 4. Economic Policy Regressions 
Method of Estimation OLS 2SLS
Economic Policy 0.04 -2.13
(.32) (.89)**
GDP/capita 1.32 -2.56
(1.61) (1.77)
Institution Index -0.11 -0.24
(0.35) (0.40)
Foreign Aid 0.33 0.06
(.12)** (.12)
Access to Medical Care 0.03 0.04
(.03) (.04)
Provision of Social Amenities -0.03 -0.07
(.03) (.03)***
Population 0.15 -0.79
(.71) (2.06)
Exchange Rate -1.33 0.48
(.30)*** (.32)
FDI 0.23 0.20
(.14) (.16)
Labor Market Participation -0.19 -0.73
(.12) (.73)
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School Enrollment 0.11 0.21
(.05)** (.04)***
Cost of Living -0.04 0.21
(.02) (1.25)
Instrument - Investment in Stocks
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00
# of observations 70 70
R-Squared 0.90 0.57
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** refers to
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. First stage results in Appendix.
 
Table 5. Government Consumption Spending Regressions 
 
Method of Estimation OLS 2SLS
Government Consumption Spending 2.89 3.02
(1.08)** (.62)***
GDP/capita 1.36 6.08
(3.24) (1.34)***
Population 1.33 -2.29
(2.24) (3.13)
Labor Market Participation 1.0 -1.70
(.54)* (.60)***
FDI -0.45 0.04
(.27) (.07)
Market Capitalization 0.08 -0.06
(.06) (.02)***
School Enrollment -0.12 0.05
(.13) (.03)
Exchange Rate -0.13 0.003
(.05)** (.03)
Inflation 0.09 -0.01
(.08) (.02)
Openness -0.02 0.03
(.06) (.05)
Political Stability 0.49 0.66
(1.14) (.32)**
Instrument - Health Access
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00
# of observations 52 51
R-Squared 0.95 0.97
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** refers to
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. First stage results in Appendix.
 
 Table 6. Economic Policy and interaction with institutions Regressions 
Method of Estimation GLS
Economic Policy -14.23
(5.96)**
Economic Policy*institutions 3.08
(1.64)*
GDP/capita 0.70
(1.22)
Foreign Aid 0.28
(.10)***
Access to Medical Care 0.06
(.02)
Provision of Social Amenities -0.03
(.02)
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Population -0.61
(.45)
Exchange Rate -0.93
(.20)***
FDI 0.11
(.11)
Labor Market Participation -0.09
(.09)
School Enrollment 0.04
(.04)**
Cost of Living -0.01
(.02)
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00
# of observations 70
R-Squared 0.94
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** refers to
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. First stage results in Appendix.
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigated factors that affect life expectancy in Africa; some questions we asked were, if government 
economic policy affects life expectancy in Africa? We find that government economic policy has a negative effect on life 
expectancy in Africa. This showed that economic policy was not contributing positively to longevity. Secondly we also 
investigated if government consumption spending cushions the factors that are a risk to longevity in Africa? We find that 
government consumption spending has a positive significant effect on life expectancy, and therefore cushions factors that 
militate against longevity. We also considered the interactive effect of economic policy and institutions. We find that the 
variable “interact” has a weak positive effect on life expectancy and contributes to longevity. This showed that channeling 
policies through appropriate institutions makes economic policies to have an effect on life expectancy. It was likely that 
government economic policy was weakened due to corruption and circumventing of due process in policy 
implementation. Our findings show that economic policies in Africa are relatively weak and do not improve the living 
conditions of people in Africa, making our analogy that only a few people in Africa benefit directly from public goods to be 
valid. Government consumption spending proved to have a positive impact on longevity, showing that it is likely that 
welfare spending improves life expectancy in Africa. Institutions we discovered are like pipes that should act as channels 
for government funds to be geared towards executing programs that can alleviate poverty in Africa, these institutions 
were either not used (in apathy with economic policies) or are corrupt making them to be like leaking pipes which can 
weaken policy effectiveness. Executing economic policies through good institutions could lead to useful and effective 
result for many African countries. 
 The policy implication of our results is that improving government economic policy (i.e. it’s monetary and trade 
policy) could significantly improve life expectancy in African countries, since economic policy is currently contributing 
negatively to longevity among African countries. Sound and consistent policies could help create employment and can 
play a role in the effective execution of public projects that can affect the lives of people living in many poor countries 
significantly. Reducing inflation and allowing strong private participation in business could rapidly transform many African 
countries and help reduce mortality rates by economically empowering its indigenous population. Our results are 
consistent with past literature such as Karl (1997) and Ross (2001), which states that corruption significantly, weakens 
economic policy in many African countries making such policies to be ineffective in alleviating poverty among their 
indigenous population. Government consumption spending was contributing positively to longevity, this implies by our 
results that governments in Africa are likely to continue to spend heavily on consumption. Executing sound policies that 
could reduce government consumption spending to a sustainable level should be a top priority for many African countries. 
Empowering people through employment to be able to afford basic social and medical amenities and the establishment of 
a strong public-private partnership in social and infrastructure development could help reduce government spending on 
welfare so that this can used for further development programmes. Our results also support reports by World Health 
Organization 2010 and UNICEF report 2011, that a host of factors are responsible for low life expectancy in Africa this 
makes government to be overwhelmed with numerous risk factors that reduce longevity leading to huge spending to 
mitigate such risks which are the causes of high death rate plaguing the continent. 
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